University of Mississippi

eGrove
Honors Theses

Honors College (Sally McDonnell Barksdale
Honors College)

Spring 5-2022

AMLO and Huachicoleo: The Effects and Implications of the Fuel
Theft Crackdown in Mexico
Samuel Starr
The University of Mississippi

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis
Part of the Central American Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Starr, Samuel, "AMLO and Huachicoleo: The Effects and Implications of the Fuel Theft Crackdown in
Mexico" (2022). Honors Theses. 2757.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/hon_thesis/2757

This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors College (Sally McDonnell
Barksdale Honors College) at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

AMLO AND HUACHICOLEO: THE EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE FUEL
THEFT CRACKDOWN IN MEXICO

Ⓒ 2022

By Samuel Starr

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for completion of the Bachelor of
Arts degree in International Studies
Croft Institute for International Studies
Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College
The University of Mississippi

Oxford, Mississippi
May 2022
Approved by

________________________
Advisor: Dr. Marcos Mendoza

________________________
Reader: Mr. Wesley Yates

________________________
Reader: Dr. Ian Gowan

Ⓒ 2022
Samuel Starr
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ii

Abstract
On December 20th, 2018—less than three weeks into new president Andrés Manuel
López Obrador’s term—the Mexican federal government initiated a crackdown on fuel theft, or
huachicoleo. The crackdown was intensive and nationwide. Its implementation was costly: gas
stations throughout the country shut down as fuel pipelines were closed, the newly established
National Guard was deployed to protect fuel infrastructure, and cartels threatened acts of terror
against the government. The crackdown ended in April of 2019, with the López Obrador
administration calling it a success. The overarching goal of this study is to test that assertion
empirically by investigating the crackdown’s effects on Mexican politics, the national economy,
and organized crime. To that end, this study uses a mixed-method approach to determine how the
crackdown impacted Mexico as well as investigate what it means in the broader context of
Mexican policy and public security. This study argues that while the crackdown was successful
politically, it fell short of accomplishing its goals for public security and was an expensive
enterprise for the Mexican government. Furthermore, this study argues that the crackdown
advantaged transnational criminal corporations in Mexico via a disproportionate impact on small
criminal groups, with whom large criminal corporations compete.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On December 27th of 2018, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador unveiled a
federal initiative intended to combat the rampant theft of hydrocarbons from state petroleum
company Petróleos Mexicanos (Gobierno de México, 2018; SEC, 2021). The effort had begun a
week before, less than three weeks into the López Obrador administration. cracked down on fuel
theft, known in Mexico as huachicoleo or huachicol, by implementing sudden changes in fuel
distribution, the deployment of a newly established National Guard to potential targets of theft,
corruption investigations, audits, and more (Felbab-Brown, 2019; Gobierno de México, 2018;
Jones & Sullivan, 2019). Finished-product gasoline pipelines were shut down in some states,
resulting in fuel scarcity for roughly two weeks (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019;
Cervantes & Woodhouse, 2019; MND, 2019). On April 23rd of 2019, López Obrador (hereafter
AMLO) mostly concluded the crackdown, calling it a mission accomplished (López Obrador,
2019).
As AMLO’s first major initiative as president, the crackdown on huachicoleo carries
enormous political significance. AMLO’s decision marks a serious departure from standard
public security policy in Mexico. The results of the initiative are similarly valuable information,
as its success or failure could set a new standard for combatting organized crime in Mexico or in
the region.
Questions surrounding the crackdown have yet to be addressed. While the presidential
administration was quick to point at reduced theft in 2019 and 2020 and call the initiative a
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massive success, there is reason to study the effects empirically (López Obrador, 2019). A
change in 2019 by no means signals a permanent effect. The impact of COVID-19 on gasoline
demand also makes a reduction in 2020 theft a questionable source of evidence. This study thus
seeks to address a number of questions that remain unanswered in the wake of the crackdown on
huachicol.
This study asks: what were the effects and implications of the 2019 fuel theft crackdown
in Mexico? More precisely, this study investigates the political and economic impacts of the
initiative before considering how the crackdown may have affected Mexican organized crime.
By addressing each impact—the political repercussions, the economic gains and costs, and the
crackdown’s degree of success in combatting cartels—a much clearer picture of the initiative can
be developed.
This study argues that the crackdown was a resounding political success for AMLO, but a
costly enterprise economically that is unlikely to have a permanent impact on the ability of
Mexican criminal corporations to steal fuels from the state. While the action was very wellreceived by voters, it was also very expensive, and the costly changes did little to create a
national fuel supply chain that is significantly better defended from theft.

Methodology
This study uses a mixed methods approach and combines methods from several
disciplines. As befits the disciplinary diversity of the study, each subject is investigated with a
unique approach and framework. Chapter 3, focusing on politics, primarily uses rhetorical
analysis. Chapter 4, focusing on economics, uses correlative indicators, financial analysis, and
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illegal market frameworks. Chapter 5 employs a variety of theoretical frameworks within the
discipline of organized crime.
The primary sources used by this study vary by chapter as well. Chapter 3 uses speeches
and weekly briefings from AMLO as well as texts he has authored. In addition, the chapter uses
polling data of opinions on the crackdown and analyzes results via populist political frameworks
previously used to study the now-president before he entered Mexico’s highest office. Chapter 4,
focusing on economic implications, utilizes Mexican stock indices, SEC 20-F Forms filed by
Petróleos Mexicanos, and data from Google Trends. Google Trends provides data on searches
for several crackdown-related keywords, which serve as stand-in data points representing the
intensity of gasoline shortages; the intensity of shortages is then correlated with Mexican stock
closing prices. Pemex 20-F forms are used for a financial analysis of the crackdown’s effect on
Pemex profitability. Chapter 5 focuses on organized crime via a case study of the state of
Guanajuato. The chapter relies on local reporting in Mexico, publicly available crime data, Drug
Enforcement Agency reports, and messaging made public by the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel and
the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. Those primary sources are used to provide a clearer picture of
the status of Mexican organized crime before, during, and after the crackdown.

Terminology and Timelines
Huachicoleo or huachicol is the theft of hydrocarbons from state oil company Pemex in
Mexico. Fuel theft is typically accomplished via an illicit tap in a finished-product pipeline,1
though other methods are used frequently (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). The hijacking of tanker
trucks and the robbery of railway tankers have also been used to steal gasoline (Jones &

“Finished-product hydrocarbons” refers to hydrocarbons that have been refined and are ready for consumer sale, as
distinguished from unrefined products such as crude.
1
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Sullivan, 2019). Fuel theft is not limited to gasoline. Theft operations have stolen natural gas,
crude, hydrocarbon-based fertilizers, and other hydrocarbon products as well; however, gasoline
theft presents the most significant and longstanding problem (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). Fuel theft
incidents have increased exponentially over the past two presidential administrations in Mexico,
from 213 incidents in 2006 to 14,956 incidents in 2018 (Aroche Aguilar, 2018).
The López Obrador administration revealed the crackdown measures seven days after
initial implementation, on December 27 of 2018. AMLO took office on December 1, 2018
(Gobierno de México, 2018). For the purposes of this study, the “fuel theft crackdown” refers to
the measures taken to combat fuel from December 20, 2018 until April 23, 2019, the date on
which AMLO declared victory over fuel theft (López Obrador, 2019). One of the most
significant events of the crackdown was a resulting gasoline crisis, primarily in south-central
Mexico. When this study refers to “gasoline shortages,” it denotes the period from January 5 to
January 19, 2019 unless otherwise noted.

Overview
Following a review of relevant literature, this study is divided by thematic area into three
sections: politics, economics, and organized crime (Chapters 3, 4, and 5, respectively). Each
chapter uses relevant primary sources to answer two questions: First, what were the crackdown’s
effects? How did the implementation of the crackdown affect relevant indicators in each
thematic area? Next, the study asks what the crackdown means—what might it indicate for the
future of Mexican politics, economics, and public security? The study concludes with results and
newly opened areas of inquiry.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Chapter 2 reviews the scholarship pertaining to organized crime, energy, and politics in
Mexico. The final section of this chapter highlights contributions to the academic literature made
by this study.

Organized Crime
Scholarship regarding organized crime in Mexico has historically focused on drugtrafficking organizations, or DTO’s. DTO’s were defined by the National Drug Intelligence
Center in 2010 as “complex organizations with highly defined command-and-control structures
that produce, transport, and/or distribute large quantities of one or more illicit drugs” (DOJ,
2010). Cartels in Mexico generally fell into this definition prior to the fall of the one-party
system in Mexico in 2000: “Under the PRI,2 the major cartels in Mexico, each with their
assigned territories (plazas) remained subordinate to a state whose officials and elite families
quietly profited from the illicit narcotics trade” (Bunker 2013). Change in Mexican organized
crime since the fall of the one-party system has been swift.
Cartels have dramatically changed their revenue sources, degree of diversification,
methods of violence, and stance towards the state in the 21st century (Bunker, 2013; CorreaCabrera, 2017; Payan & Correa-Cabrera, 2014). This new type of organization is highly
diversified, “...moving from drug smuggling to making billions of dollars in illegal mining and

Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), the party that dominated Mexico’s
political system and elections until 2000.
2
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iron ore exports, illicit logging, human trafficking and smuggling, kidnapping for ransom,
extortion, and pirated goods” (Payan & Correa-Cabrera, 2014). Previously limited to the drug
trade, Mexican organized crime is now invested in crime in general.
These new groups, variously referred to as “polyglot criminal organizations” (Bunker,
2013), “Zeta Model” (Correa Cabrera 2017), “3rd Phase Cartels” (Bunker 2011) and other titles
are less easily characterized by their involvement in the drug trade. Criminal enterprises have
also become more international. Many have created connections with foreign criminal
enterprises or licit businesses, as well as expanded their operations into foreign countries
(Correa-Cabrera, 2017; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2020; McCarthy-Jones & Baldino, 2016).
Accordingly, modern organized crime groups in Mexico can be more accurately characterized as
transnational criminal organizations (hereafter TCO’s) than as drug-trafficking organizations.
TCO’s are more diversified criminal groups operating in the likeness of a transnational or
multinational corporation (Correa-Cabrera 2017). Mexican TCO’s have also expanded into the
control of licit markets in their increasing attempts to diversify revenue streams (Erickson &
Owen, 2020).
Some small criminal groups, such as the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, focus primarily on
illegal markets that were left untouched by cartels organized as DTO’s (Jones & Sullivan, 2019).
Such groups, smaller and less diversified than TCO’s, compete against TCO’s in the narrow
markets in which they participate (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). These unconventional groups, while
not TCO’s, still contrast sharply with drug-trafficking organizations in that they operate in
entirely different criminal markets.
Mexican TCO’s can be defined under a broad degree of theoretical frameworks, given
that they can act as corporations, insurgents, criminal groups, state challengers, state cooperators
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and so on depending on a wide array of economic and political factors (Celaya Pacheco, 2009)
(Correa-Cabrera 2017). TCO’s in Mexico have been analyzed through civil war literature
(Atuesta & Pérez-Dávila, 2018) (Correa-Cabrera 2017), business administration literature
(Correa-Cabrera 2017), traditional criminal justice models (Vilalta, 2014), territorial governance
models (Maldonado Aranda, 2014a, 2014b; Mendoza 2022) and irregular warfare models as
“criminal insurgencies,” and terrorists (Brands, 2009; Bunker, 2013; Celaya Pacheco, 2009).
Despite the rapid changes in cartel organization, one aspect remains unchanged: Whether
through a business, political, or criminal framework, Mexican TCO’s “...have the same essential
goal...to maximize profits” (Correa-Cabrera 2017:62). Accordingly, the success of a TCO can be
roughly gauged by its apparent capability to generate profit. As aforementioned, modern TCO’s
in Mexico have an extremely diversified portfolio, akin to a transnational conglomerate (Payan
& Correa-Cabrera, 2014). Therefore, analyzing a given cartel’s ability to earn income will vary
depending on its revenue streams. Cartel capabilities can also be measured by their perceived
governance areas or spheres of control (Celaya Pacheco, 2009).

Energy
In discerning the economic effects of the huachicoleo crackdown in Mexico, this study
addresses how Mexican oil production has been affected by theft, how distribution of oil has
been affected by the closure of pipelines, and what the effects have been on consumers.
The theft of hydrocarbons in Mexico has had a strong effect on PEMEX. Fuel theft
caused around US $3 billion in losses for PEMEX in 2018, as AMLO’s crackdown began; for
reference, PEMEX suffered a total loss of US $9.16 billion that year (Cunningham, 2019; SEC,
2020). Fuel theft can thus be seen as a strong threat to the health of the Mexican oil industry. The
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theft of fuel in Mexico most often occurs through taps on finished-product pipelines (Jones &
Sullivan, 2019). In recent years, the theft has “…transitioned from a basically local activity,
well-organised but not violent, to merge with drug-trafficking organisations” with the collusion
of corrupt PEMEX officials (Hernández Ibarzábal & Bonilla, 2020). Cartel takeover of
huachicoleo has made the practice more violent and more difficult for the Mexican government
to combat (Jones & Sullivan, 2019; Sullivan & Bunker, 2019a).
Existing scholarship regarding AMLO’s energy policy in Mexico has generally focused
on the relationships between AMLO’s “Fourth Transformation” or 4T and Mexican energy
markets. AMLO’s 4T platform is based on recreating Mexico via a national transformation; a
significant portion of his promises relate to Mexico’s energy sector. 4T has promised to “achieve
energy sovereignty in Mexico” and “eradicate fuel theft,” statements which have been given
various interpretations within the existing literature (Hernández Ibarzábal & Bonilla, 2020).
Energy sovereignty can be generally understood to signify a country’s capability to act
independently in providing energy within its borders (Menconi et al., 2016). Mexico, despite
ample crude reserves, has become increasingly dependent on U.S. gasoline products following
the partial privatization of PEMEX, which provides context for such a national objective
(Gutierrez et al., 2021).
Existing scholarship indicates that the dual goals of eliminating fuel theft and achieving
energy sovereignty may prove difficult to achieve simultaneously. AMLO’s primary weapon
against fuel theft has been the closure of pipelines, which has strong implications for the
distribution of gasoline and other finished petroleum products in Mexico. Existing logistics
literature shows that Mexico’s infrastructure was incapable of handling pipeline closures while
still meeting fuel needs, primarily due to a shortage of fuel depots (Caballero-Morales &
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Martínez-Flores, 2019). Gasoline imports from the United States increased sharply following the
pipeline closures; however, scholarship on a possible relation between the two does not yet exist.
Scholarship is similarly lacking as to the other effects of the closures.

Mexican Politics
Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador assumed office on December 1st,
2018, after a massive win by the party he created: the Movimiento Regeneración Nacional
(National Regeneration Movement) or MORENA. The party took a large majority in both
legislative houses as well as 5 of the 9 governorships in contention in 2018; accordingly, AMLO
has perhaps one of the strongest mandates of any leader since the fall of the PRI (Speck, 2019).
The existing literature regarding AMLO tends to define him as a center-left populist, both in his
style and his policy (Felbab-Brown, 2019; Hernández Ibarzábal & Bonilla, 2020; Speck, 2019).
The concept of Latin American populism is a highly contested issue in the scholarship, as
is even the concept of populism (Knight, 2016; Mudde, 2004; Schroeder, 2020). Populism can be
variously interpreted as a style of leadership, a political strategy, or a political ideology (Mudde,
2004; Schroeder, 2020).
Populism can be broadly defined as “…an ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus
‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté Générale
(general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004). While each definition is general and contested in
the scholarship, populism can be broadly considered an anti-elitist, anti-corruption, people-first
style of policymaking (Knight, 2016; Mudde, 2004; Schroeder, 2020). Center-left populists in
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Latin America have historically highlighted wealth redistribution from corporations and elites to
the working class (Absher et al., 2020; Schamis et al., 2006).
AMLO’s crackdown on fuel theft has been considered a reflection of his populist style of
leadership. Part of his strategy to improve public safety has been a differentiated approach to
organized crime, emphasizing peaceful measures and structural causes of crime: “abrazos no
balazos” or “hugs not bullets” has been a key phrase (Speck, 2019). His attempts to crack down
on huachicoleo have also focused more on corruption and nonviolent measures: fuel pipeline
closures and arrests of corrupt officials have been two primary methods of combatting theft
(Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019; Felbab-Brown, 2019; Navarro, 2017). Corruption
in general has been a major focus of the AMLO administration. AMLO’s rhetoric on corruption
has taken a populist approach, invoking an idea of theft from “the people” by the corrupt elite
and stating that “Only [he] can fix corruption” (Speck, 2019). The crackdown thus departs from
previous strategy, which isolated organized criminal groups as the cause for fuel theft and
combatted theft through combatting criminal groups directly (Speck, 2019). Instead, the
president has looked towards government via corruption crackdowns and to non-confrontational
preventative approaches such as the shutdown of fuel pipelines. On the other hand, AMLO has
created a national guard which has also been used to combat fuel theft militarily, which has been
interpreted in some literature as a return to previous policies involving the use of force against
huachicoleros (Speck, 2019).
Oil and fuel theft play a substantial role in AMLO’s promised 4T, or Fourth
Transformation. Oil continues to play a massive role in the Mexican economy, and continued
fuel theft reduces the potential of PEMEX to regain its status as a source of state income and
pride; as such, the fight against fuel theft has been seen as “…a fight for the nation” between the
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state and organized criminals (Hernández Ibarzábal & Bonilla, 2020). Oil has been interpreted in
some literature as a guarantor of sovereignty, particularly as relates to decolonization literature
(Dietrich, 2015).

Contribution to the Literature
This study adds to existing academic literature by investigating AMLO’s crackdown on
huachicoleo in greater depth than previous works. Rather than view the crackdown as a symptom
of the president’s populist center-left policy, this study investigates the crackdown within the
broader context of AMLO’s agenda. While previous studies have acknowledged the crackdown,
little empirical investigation into its effects has occurred. As such, this study seeks to provide a
thorough investigation of the crackdown’s effects and implications in the realms of politics,
economics, and public security in Mexico. In addition, this study hopes to break ground in the
growing literature regarding unconventional criminal organizations in Mexico.
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Chapter 3: The Political Implications of the Huachicoleo Crackdown
This chapter explores the political response to AMLO’s crackdown on fuel theft. After
providing background on fuel theft as an issue in Mexican politics, the study investigates the
president’s rhetoric as he presented the crackdown to the public in a speech in December of
2018. The study then investigates the political reception of the action via Mudde’s populist
framework. This chapter concludes that the crackdown was a major political success for the
president that could represent a new direction for Mexican public security policy.

Politics in Mexico
In the years following the Mexican Revolution, a one-party system led by the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), or PRI, was established in
Mexico (Hamnett, 2019). The PRI had near-total political hegemony from 1929 onward but
began to unravel in the late 20th century, finally losing its absolute authority with the 2000
presidential election (Hamnett, 2019). President Vicente Fox was the first opposition president,
leading the conservative Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) to the
presidency in 2000 (Hamnett, 2019). President Felipe Calderón, also of PAN, won office in 2006
by a margin of less than 1% against Andrés Manuel López Obrador (Hamnett, 2019). Calderón
was succeeded by Enrique Peña Nieto, a PRI candidate, from 2012-2018; AMLO again came
second in the national vote (Hamnett, 2019). In 2018, AMLO won on his third run, this time with
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the Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement, MORENA), a
party he established following his 2012 defeat (Hamnett, 2019).
AMLO captured the largest percentage of the electorate since the Mexican Revolution
and claimed victory in all but the state of Guanajuato, which was won by the PAN (INE, 2018).
Figure 3.1

Candidate
Andrés

Party
Manuel

Percentage of Vote

López MORENA

53.19%

Obrador
Ricardo Anaya

PAN

22.28%

José Antonio Meade

PRI

5.23%

Independents/Other/Invalid

8.12%

2018 Mexican presidential election results (INE, 2018)

AMLO campaigned on corruption crackdowns, the creation of a nationalist economic
approach that tempered neoliberal influences, and a demilitarized approach to ending Mexico’s
drug war and reducing the power of organized crime (Felbab-Brown, 2019; Hernández Ibarzábal
& Bonilla, 2020; Speck, 2019). As a presidential candidate, AMLO promised to usher in a
“Fourth Transformation” of Mexico, or 4T, referencing three prior transformations of Mexico:
Mexico’s War of Independence (1810-1821), the Reform War (1858-1861), and the Mexican
Revolution (1910-1917) (Speck, 2019).
AMLO’s 4T platform was in opposition to a number of neoliberal policies put in place by
his predecessors, especially relating to energy policy (Speck, 2019). In a list of 100 promises of
the 4T platform by the AMLO campaign, six highlight energy policy ("100 Compromisos"). In
Promise 70, the president pledges to “…allocate more public investment to urgently produce
more oil, gas and electricity and thus face the crisis left by neoliberal politicians and those
13

responsible for the so-called energy reform3 ("100 Compromisos"). Past presidents, particularly
Enrique Peña Nieto, had begun the process of partial privatization of Mexican state oil company
Pemex, which had been nationalized since 1938 (Ackground et al., 2015; Gutierrez et al., 2021;
Hamnett, 2019). As a piece of his campaign, AMLO pledged to reverse privatization and
increase Mexico’s ability to produce and refine hydrocarbons (López Obrador, 2021). 4T
emphasized the importance of refining capability and lamented the fact that Mexico, despite its
significant oil reserves, was forced to import substantial amounts of gasoline due to a limited
capacity in refining ("100 Compromisos").

AMLO and Populism
A study using Cas Mudde’s populist framework found that AMLO utilizes several
populist strategies. When directing a speech at favorable audiences, like a campaign rally,
AMLO tends to divide the Mexican people in Manichean terms, separating the pure masses
(whom he claims to represent) from the corrupt elites, especially PRI and PAN officials (Bruhn,
2012). AMLO has claimed that the 2000 fall of the PRI did not result in real change for
Mexicans, as it was “a crude continuation of the corrupt regime” of neoliberalism (López
Obrador, 2021:15). AMLO tends to refer to social assistance as a universal right, which he states
can be funded through a crackdown on high-level corruption (Bruhn, 2012).
AMLO has used his political perspective on Mexican institutions—corrupt, elitecontrolled, and sometimes undemocratic—as a way of questioning election results, especially
after the tightly contested 2006 election (Bruhn, 2012). The President also called for a recall vote

“Vamos a destinar mayor inversión pública para producir con urgencia más petróleo, gas y energía eléctrica y así
enfrentar la crisis que dejaron los políticos neoliberales y los responables de la llamada reforma energética”
3
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against himself to be held in 2022, arguing that it would strengthen democracy; opposition
claims is a costly move to consolidate power (de Haldevang, 2021; Graham, 2020).

Fuel Theft in Politics
The Calderón administration saw fuel theft rise from 213 incidents in 2006 to 1,635 by
the end of the six-year term in 2012 (Aroche Aguilar, 2018; IGAVIM, 2021). The Peña Nieto
(hereafter EPN) presidency oversaw a rise from 1635 to 14,956 incidents in 2018 (Aroche
Aguilar, 2018). The exponential rise in fuel theft in Mexico has brought the issue to the forefront
of national attention.
The Calderón administration, as a part of its militarization of the fight against narcotics,
fought huachicol primarily through the targeted killing or arrest of leaders of organized criminal
groups (Jones & Sullivan, 2019; Speck, 2019). The EPN presidency pursued similar tactics
(Speck, 2019). AMLO’s proposed strategy fell in line (at least partly) with his demilitarized
approach to public security, focusing on corruption and the interruption of supply (Jones &
Sullivan, 2019). His huachicoleo crackdown was by no means entirely peaceful, however;
AMLO deployed 4000 soldiers around the country to defend refineries and pipelines while
drastically stiffening punishments for huachicoleros, making fuel theft a felony crime without
the possibility of bail (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). Corruption measures focused on investigations
into Pemex officials as well as audits, account freezes, and license revocations for gas stations
caught dealing in the illegal gasoline market (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). For the average Mexican
citizen, the most impactful aspect of the crackdown was pipeline shutdowns, which for many
made gasoline nearly impossible to purchase for a period of about two weeks (Cárdenas et al.,
2019). Noting the impact of shutdowns on the public, this study seeks to investigate how the
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Mexican electorate viewed the crackdown, as well as explore the political implications of
AMLO’s actions for the future of Mexican politics and public security.

AMLO’s Framing of the Crackdown
Previous Mexican presidents have used force, both through the justice system and
through the military, as the primary means of deterring fuel theft (Jones & Sullivan, 2019; Speck,
2019). While AMLO has not completely avoided the use of force against fuel theft, he has
framed the crackdown as a departure from the militaristic policies of his predecessors (FelbabBrown, 2019).
In introducing the crackdown in a speech on December 27, 2018, AMLO referred to
corruption in nine separate instances. He referred to the planned use of force just once.
Figure 3.2:
References

English

Spanish

Corruption

If we think of 600 pipes daily, we

Si pensamos en 600 pipas diarias, no

are not only speaking of the so-

estamos sólo hablando del llamado

called huachicol, the tapping of

huachicol, la ordeña de ductos;

pipelines; we are speaking of a plan

estamos hablando de un plan que

with links to the interior of the

tiene vinculación al interior del

government and that is supported by

gobierno y que se apoya en un

a fuel distribution system, because it

sistema

is not easy to distribute, sell 600

combustibles, porque no es fácil

pipes worth of gasoline daily.

distribuir, vender 600 pipas diarias

de

distribución

de

de gasolina diarias.
Corruption

That is why we are going to fight

Por eso vamos a combatir este robo

this theft inside and outside of

afuera y adentro de las instalaciones
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Corruption

Corruption

Pemex facilities.

de Pemex.

Look, 1,145 pipes per day, 1,145

Miren, mil 145 pipas por día, mil

pipes. That is huachicol, but from

145 pipas. Eso es huachicol, pero

above.

desde arriba.

There is the hypothesis that, of all of

Hay la hipótesis de que, de todo el

the theft, only 20 percent happens

robo, solo el 20 por ciento se da con

with pipeline taps, which is a kind of

la ordeña de ductos, que es una

cover, that most of it has to do with

especie de pantalla, que la mayor

a plan that operates with the

parte tiene que ver con un plan que

complicity of authorities and with a

se opera con la complicidad de

distribution network.

autoridades y con una red de
distribución.

Corruption

Corruption

The purpose of this plan is to

Este plan tiene como propósito

prevent this theft, to not tolerate the

evitar este robo, no tolerar que se

continuation of these thefts, to not

sigan cometiendo estos robos, no

allow corruption.

permitir la corrupción.

We have to end this corruption.

Tenemos

que

acabar

con

esta

corrupción.
Corruption

And I call on Pemex workers to

Y yo convoco a los trabajadores de

support us, to help us achieve the

Pemex para que nos apoyen, nos

goal of zero corruption.

ayuden a que se logre el propósito de
cero corrupción.

Corruption

We as Mexicans cannot continue to

No podemos los mexicanos, seguir

be embarrassed, to occupy the 135th

pasando vergüenzas; ocupar el lugar

spot among 176 countries, the 135th

135 entre 176 países, el lugar 135

spot as a corrupt country. The

como país corrupto. El objetivo es

objective is to end corruption.

acabar con la corrupción.
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The Use of Force

A reform to the Constitution, to the

Está por aprobarse una reforma a la

law, is about to be approved, so that

Constitución, a las leyes, para que el

the theft of hydrocarbons becomes a

robo de hidrocarburos sea delito

serious crime, without right to bail,

grave, sin derecho a fianza, porque

because until now it is not a serious

hasta ahora no es delito grave, y

crime, and they are easily released

salen fácilmente bajo fianza. Ya no

on bail. It won’t be like that

va a ser así. Y no va a importar la

anymore. And it won’t matter how

cantidad de lo robado.

much was stolen.
Corruption

…there will not be corruption for

…no va a haber corrupción para

anyone, not above nor below; that

nadie, ni arriba, ni abajo; que vamos

we will cleanse the government of

a limpiar de corrupción al gobierno,

corruption, that is the purpose.

que ese es el propósito.

(Emphasis added)
References to corruption and the use of force in AMLO’s public address on December 27, 2018 (López Obrador,
2018).

The crackdown on fuel theft, as presented to the public, is thus a corruption crackdown.
Rather than look outward towards the criminal organizations that have made fuel theft so
prevalent, AMLO directs attention towards the government, insisting that fuel theft could not
occur at 2018 levels without significant support from state actors.

The Crackdown’s Public Perception
As is evidenced through polling data, AMLO’s decision to portray the illegal fuel market
as corurption-driven seems to have paid significant political dividends. While no firm
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conclusions about the electorate’s opinion of the actions can be drawn, data seems to suggest that
the action was viewed favorably on the national scale.
Gasoline shortages, the most salient negative repercussion of the crackdown, do not
appear to have negatively impacted AMLO’s approval to a serious degree. Significant shortages
occurred almost exclusively in January of 2019 (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019).
An aggregation of the six largest approval polls in Mexico compiled by communications firm
ORACULUS shows that approval of AMLO increased from 76% in December, when he took
office, to 79% in January and 81% in February (Márquez, 2021). A poll from communications
firm Gabinete provides further insights. The poll, conducted 100 days into AMLO’s term,
showed that 86% of respondents agreed with the actions taken to deter fuel theft, with just 12.8%
in disagreement (Gabinete, 2019).4 Poll respondents were also asked what action, among a list of
19 options, they thought was the best measure implemented by the president in the first 100
days5; the most chosen response, with 27.2% of respondents, was combatting fuel theft
(Gabinete, 2019).6 When asked the worst measure, only 4.5% selected “Combatting fuel theft /
gasoline shortages” (Gabinete, 2019).7
It should be noted that the actions were somewhat less popular during their initial
execution. Several protests opposing the pipeline shutdowns were staged in January (Graham,
2019). There is evidence to suggest the closures were popular even as their worst consequences
struck, however: In a poll by Consulta Mitofsky conducted from January 9th to 11th of 2019—as

Respondents were asked “¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con la aplicación de las siguientes medidas?”
86% responded “Muy/Algo de acuerdo” and 12.8% responded “Algo/Muy en desacuerdo” with the remaining 2.2%
either not answering or selecting one of “Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo” or “No sabe” in response to the prompt
“Cierre de ductos y distribución de combustibles a través de pipas para el combate del Huachicoleo” (Closure of
pipelines and distribution of fuel through pipes to combat fuel theft).
5
“Por lo que sabe o ha escuchado, ¿cuál considera que ha sido la mejor medida que ha implementado el Presidente
en sus primeros 100 días de gobierno?”
6
“Combate al huachicoleo”
7
“Combate al huachicoleo/desabasto de gasolina”
4
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shortages raged throughout the country—50% of respondents approved of the president’s
shutdown of pipelines, with just 40% in disagreement and the remainder unsure (Graham, 2019).
The crisis contrasts sharply with a similar event that occurred in January two years prior:
el gasolinazo, a series of protests and riots that followed a gasoline price hike in Mexico in 2017.
The EPN administration had increased prices as part of a plan to partially privatize Pemex and
salvage its profitability (Okeowo, 2017). That 20% price markup sparked labor strikes, deadly
riots, and attacks on police (Okeowo, 2017). Enrique Peña Nieto’s (hereafter EPN) approval
ratings did not prove nearly as sturdy as AMLO’s. EPN saw his public approval sink from 23%
prior to the price hike to 17% the month after, with ratings not recovering for another 7 months
(Márquez, 2021). Considering that the results of the gasolinazo and the huachicoleo crackdown
were comparable—a rapid decrease in motor fuel accessibility—comparing the two may help
explain the crackdown’s relative lack of political fallout.
Figure 3.3

Huachicoleo Crackdown
President and party initiating Andrés

Manuel

action

Obrador, MORENA

Type of reduced availability

Shortage

Gasolinazo

López Enrique Peña Nieto, PRI

20.1% price increase

Length of reduced availability Roughly two weeks

Indefinite

Geographic distribution of South-central Mexico8

National

reduced availability
Motivation for change

Combatting fuel theft

8

Privatization of gasoline sales

Primarily the states of Hidalgo, Mexico, Jalisco, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Queretaro, and Aguascalientes. The
degree of shortages varied strongly by state; the worst effects were in the state of Guanajuato, where 84% of gas
stations had no fuel in the second week of January. See Caballero-Morales and Martínez-Flores.
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Presidential approval month 76%

23%

prior to reduced availability
Presidential approval change Both positive

Both negative

in month of crisis and month
following
Comparison of the crackdown on huachicoleo and the gasolinazo.

Immediately notable in Figure 3.3 is that shortages in the huachicoleo crackdown were
resolved, while the increase in gasoline prices by the EPN administration was a permanent
change. While that fact lends itself to a more favorable perception after the crisis, it fails to
explain why the huachicoleo crackdown was more supported than not when the crisis was
underway (Graham, 2019). While the problems resulting from AMLO’s initiative were more
localized, the shortages by no means affected a small portion of the population. The region
severely affected by logistical issues makes up a third of the electorate, while panic buying and
cross-state purchases of gasoline from affected populations spread throughout Mexico, resulting
in shortages in areas without severe supply-side problems (Caballero-Morales & MartínezFlores, 2019; Carrizales, 2019; Gutiérrez, 2019; INE, 2018). Gas stations shutdowns occurred in
states as distant as Sonora (Cervantes & Woodhouse, 2019). It is difficult, therefore, to assume
that the crackdown received such a high degree of support because the majority of the population
was unaffected.
The political context of each event may be more relevant. EPN’s decision came as part
of a move to partially privatize a company that had been nationalized since 1938 (Hamnett,
2019). He did so after a number of corruption scandals had overtaken his own administration,
including his having used a luxury apartment of a wealthy businessman and his wife having
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bought a house from a contractor that had received favorable government deals (Okeowo, 2017).
AMLO’s action was centered around ending corruption, placing blame on the government.
Mudde’s populist framework provides additional insights. AMLO has previously
described Mexican politics in Manichean terms, separating the pure and honest “people” from
the corrupt “elite” (Bruhn, 2012; Mudde, 2004). The political success of the crackdown on fuel
theft may be grounded, at least in part, from a similar separation in his rhetoric surrounding the
action. AMLO chooses not to focus on criminal organizations or Pemex workers in his rhetoric.
This is in spite of ample evidence that criminal organizations commit most fuel theft and that
many Pemex workers are necessary pieces in the distribution network he describes. Instead,
AMLO continuously refers to corruption and corrupt actors in an abstract sense and separates
those actors from the Mexican people: “We as Mexicans cannot continue to be embarrassed, to
occupy the 135th spot among 176 countries, the 135th spot as a corrupt country. The objective is
to end corruption” (López Obrador, 2018).

The Political and Ideological Implications of the Crackdown
In choosing to focus on corruption in his policy and discourse on organized criminal
markets, AMLO created a new path in Mexican politics. His decision to shut down pipelines and
attack corrupt practices in the hydrocarbon industry demonstrated that the president was serious
about his intentions of taking the issue of public security in Mexico in a new direction. Polling
shows that the Mexican public was overwhelmingly supportive of that new path.
Where might that new path lead? Based on AMLO’s discourse and policy actions during
the crackdown, we can see that AMLO views corruption as the root cause of the public security
crisis in Mexico. We can thus expect AMLO to continue focusing on fighting the transactions
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between the state and criminal enterprises that, in his view, have allowed criminal organizations
to grow so powerful in Mexico. We can furthermore expect that the president will continue to
look towards government first as he seeks to place blame. Such policy has significant
implications for the Mexican government’s future stance on public security. In identifying
corruption as the source of cartel power, rather than their capacity to use violence, the president
sets a new target for Mexican federal authorities: the Mexican government itself. If the power of
organized criminal groups stems from corruption, no amount of dead cartel leaders nor military
deployments into domestic territory would be sufficient to solve the security crisis. Instead, the
federal government would center its efforts around ending corruption, whatever form that may
take.
As relates to energy policy, we can expect AMLO to continue to emphasize the
importance of Mexican energy sovereignty. The president has already taken action to reduce
Mexican dependence on foreign finished-product hydrocarbons (Gutierrez et al., 2021; López
Obrador, 2021). Via the crackdown on huachicoleo, AMLO has placed importance on the
Mexican people’s possession of national energy resources. In attacking corrupt public workers
and organized crime, he has demonstrated an attempt to retake control of public resources, in
parallel with other economic policy.
AMLO’s new direction distances the López Obrador administration from its
predecessors. The Calderón and EPN administrations took drastically different approaches to
theft of fuels, both focused on the use of force. Both also failed to slow the exponential rise of
fuel theft in Mexico. Just as importantly, AMLO’s policy shift may change the conduct of future
Mexican leaders. The resounding political success that AMLO had in targeting corrupt
bureaucracy, rather than violently targeting organized criminal groups, could encourage other
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officeholders to follow in AMLO’s new path in taking on organized crime. That path will not
necessarily address Mexico’s public security issues. As is addressed in the following chapters,
the crackdown was far more successful politically than practically.

24

Chapter 4: The Economic Implications of the Huachicoleo Crackdown
This chapter investigates how the 2019 crackdown on huachicoleo affected the Mexican
economy. The chapter begins by examining several macroeconomic indicators in Mexico in
relation to the intensity of gasoline shortages. The chapter then uses existing illegal market
frameworks to analyze how the crackdown may have affected the market for stolen gasoline.
Finally, the chapter attends to how the crackdown affected Mexican state oil company Pemex.
This chapter finds that while the Mexican national economy remained mostly unaffected,
the government likely incurred major costs in implementing the crackdown; these costs were
ignored by the presidential administration in statements following the crackdown’s conclusion.
Furthermore, this study finds that the crackdown may have inadvertently benefitted large,
widespread criminal organizations.

The Crackdown and the Mexican National Economy
Gasoline shortages were a significant economic event for a large section of the Mexican
population during the crackdown on huachicoleo. In investigating the economic repercussions,
this study finds that while significant economic disruptions occurred in highly affected states,
there is no evidence to suggest that the Mexican economy suffered any serious effects on the
national scale. Lagging macroeconomic indicators (indicators which denote changes after an
economic change has occurred) did not decline in the months following the crackdown.
Mexico’s national consumer confidence indicator moved from 45.9 in January 2019 to 47.8 in
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February (INEGI, 2019b). Unemployment moved from 3.44% to 3.40% in the same timeframe
(INEGI, 2019a). The small increase in those indicators would suggest that the crackdown did not
cause enough disruption to significantly damage long-term economic activity in Mexico.
Concurrent data (indicators which denote changes while an economic change is
occurring) also fail to present evidence of national economic disruption. To determine the daily
level of shortage intensity, this study used Google Trends 9 for the keywords “gasolina,”
“ductos,” “gasoductos,” “huachicol,” and “desabasto” in Mexico from December 1, 2018 (when
AMLO took office) through the end of January 2019.10 Searches for those words spikes during
the timeframe shortages were reported (from around January 5 to January 20, 2019), and the
seven states severely affected have the highest search frequencies; search frequency peaked in
Guanajuato, where gasoline shortages were most intense (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores,
2019). Figure 3.1 shows the frequency of searches, ranging from 1 as least frequently to 100 as
most frequently, in relation to the Mexican Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC), a capweighted total market index of the Mexican stock exchange. As a total-market index, the IPC
was selected to represent concurrent change in the Mexican financial market in its entirety. As
may be noted, the market maintained a moderate positive trend throughout the crackdown and
saw minor disruptions at most at the peak of gasoline shortages. A lack of disruption on a totalmarket index may indicate insignificant disruption to Mexican markets as a whole.

9

Google Trends indicates frequency of searches on Google in a given timeframe for given keywords.
Keywords in English: gasoline, pipelines, fuel pipelines, fuel theft, shortage

10
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Figure 4.1
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Greater economic disruption occurred in areas where shortages were most severe. A poll
of 3500 business owners in Michoacán, Querétaro, and Guanajuato estimated that the shortages
caused around 1.25 billion pesos in damage in those three states (BBC, n.d.). Damage appears to
have varied by industry, with agriculture being particularly hard hit. Due to an inability to
transport laborers to agricultural sites, Guanajuato’s Agricultural Development Secretariat placed
losses at around 200 million pesos for the sector (MND, 2019). While such impacts were severe
in highly affected states, evidence does not suggest that the crackdown caused significant
disruption in the Mexican national economy as a whole.
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The Crackdown and the Market for Stolen Gasoline
The pipeline shutdowns initiated during the huachicoleo crackdown created a supply
squeeze in the gasoline market in Mexico. Through an economic sociology of transactions in the
market for stolen gasoline, this study argues that the government created an advantage for more
established cartels with geographically larger zones of control.
The market for stolen gasoline has existed in Mexico for nearly as long as the legal
market for gasoline (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). However, the market has changed substantially
over the past two decades. In assessing that change, this study identifies two types of
huachicoleo markets, which will be referred to as “old huachicoleo” and “new huachicoleo.” Old
huachicoleo consisted of individual thieves or small bands of thieves who created rudimentary
pipeline siphons and sold stolen gasoline directly to locals at a steep discount; these thieves were
criminals, but they were not integrated members of criminal organizations (Jones & Sullivan,
2019). The new huachicoleo market is dominated by cartels, is often more organized and
efficient, a(Arroyo Macías, 2019; Jones & Sullivan, 2019)s, 2019; Jones & Sullivan, 2019).
In Mexico, gasoline is held at a fixed price set by the state (SEC, 2020). The majority of
gas stations in Mexico operate under the Pemex brand; a handful of those stations are operated
directly by Pemex, but the vast majority are franchised to private owners (Favela & Lerma,
2020; SEC, 2020). In the new huachicoleo market, cartels more commonly sell large amounts of
gasoline to gas station owners at a reduced price, rather than sell directly to consumers (Arroyo
Macías, 2019; Jones & Sullivan, 2019). Cartel theft and sales are typically aided by co-opted
Pemex employees, with some officials (including the President, AMLO) estimating that around
80% of fuel theft incidents involved corrupted Pemex employees; some have argued that it is
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reasonable to acknowledge a “parallel Pemex” consisting of illegal transactions (Cunningham,
2019; Hernández Ibarzábal & Bonilla, 2020; Jones & Sullivan, 2019).
Figure 4.2

Transactions of “old” huachicoleo.

Figure 4.3

Transactions of “new” huachicoleo.

An economic sociology framework adds clarity to how business transactions have been
altered as organized crime has taken control of the illegal gasoline market. In new huachicoleo,
the consumer buys gasoline with a legal status that cannot be easily discerned; with the
transaction not known to be illegal, their purchase is legitimate. The crackdown on fuel theft is
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not directly affecting the consumer’s transaction in the new model—consumers will continue to
buy from gas stations—and so the relationships being altered are the two clearly illegal
transactions: that between the state and the cartel (transactions in which public servants are
corrupted) and that between the cartel and the gasoline distributor.
A cartel’s ability to supply stolen product depends in part on its ability to co-opt state
officials. The crackdown’s corruption measures are intended to reduce that ability; without any
explicit information regarding the extent of Pemex corruption, however, it is difficult to discern
how effective the crackdown was in disrupting transactions between public servants and
organized crime.
The relationship between cartels and gasoline distributors is clearer. The state, while not
a party to the transaction, should be considered a central actor. In naming the transaction illegal,
the state denies the market all the protections granted to legal transactions: property rights,
contracts, the ability to resolve disputes in the legal system, and any other market mechanism
that relies on the rule of law (Beckert & Dewey, 2017). Illegal markets are left with three
primary mechanisms with which to establish business relationships: reputation, violence, and
state co-optation (Beckert & Dewey, 2017).
In the case of gasoline distributors purchasing illegal gasoline, violence can be taken off
the table quickly, assuming that no gas station franchisee seriously considers an act of violence
against their cartel supplier. While state co-optation may reduce prosecution risk, it does not
provide a supply of gasoline for franchisees. The relationship between gasoline distributors and
cartels, then, relies on cartel reputation to reliably deliver product in a fair transaction, as well as
the ability of cartels to use violence on gasoline distributors.
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As pipelines were shut down during the crackdown, the cartel gasoline supply was
lessened—however, the degree of disruption likely varied for each group. That disruption would
likely affect the mechanism of reputation used to create business relationships in illegal markets:
if one seller cannot supply a gasoline franchisee, their reputability as a supplier would fall. In
areas where multiple cartels contest market control, cartels with less supply disruption would be
at an advantage.
Two cartels operating in the state of Guanajuato provide an example. The Cártel de Santa
Rosa de Lima (hereafter Santa Rosa Cartel) is an organized criminal group that has historically
operated in the state of Guanajuato almost exclusively (Sullivan & Bunker, 2019b; A. Torres,
2020). Their chief rival, in 2019 as well as today, is the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación
(Jalisco New Generation Cartel, hereafter CJNG) (Torres 2020; “Jalisco Cartel New Generation”
2020). CJNG controls some territory in every Mexican state aside from Sinaloa and has nearhegemonic control of illegal markets in several Mexican states (“Jalisco Cartel New Generation”
2020).
The differences in geographic spread between those two groups likely affected their
ability to steal gasoline. The finished-product gasoline pipeline shutdown implemented during
the huachicoleo crackdown was not uniform throughout the country: the government initiated
such measures primarily in states where fuel theft was already occurring at high rates (CaballeroMorales & Martínez-Flores, 2019). However, as noted by the director general of Pemex, theft
spiked in other areas once shutdowns were initiated; Pemex information suggested that some
cartels had simply shifted operations (Jones & Sullivan, 2019). Cartels with a national reach, like
CJNG, would be more capable of continuing operations during pipeline shutdowns than cartels
that only held territory in shutdown-affected areas, such as Santa Rosa. In the event of finished-
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product pipeline shutdowns, theft of other hydrocarbons would remain a viable option; CJNG,
for example, could take advantage of its domination in Veracruz, the source of a significant share
of Mexico’s natural gas production (Dittmar, 2020).
Figure 4.4

CJNG Areas of Influence (Dittmar, 2020).
Figure 4.5

Areas of focus of the fuel theft crackdown (Caballero-Morales
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& Martínez-Flores, 2019).

As aforementioned, illegal market firms have an extremely limited arsenal as they
compete for business partners. As gas station franchisees sought product during the crackdown,
larger cartels were likely more capable of providing it; as they did so, they established their firm
as the more reliable supplier. Smaller criminal organizations would be left with the threat of
violence as the only mechanism for ensuring a continued relationship—a threat that may not hold
in contested market zones.
In concentrating pipeline shutdowns in high-theft areas, the government may have
inadvertently assisted more dominant and widespread cartels, while putting smaller criminal
organizations at a disadvantage in the market. That hypothesis is corroborated in Chapter 5.

The Crackdown’s Effects on Pemex
Fuel theft is much more than a headache for Mexican state petroleum company Pemex. In
2018, the company recorded a $9 billion net loss; the company attributed more than $3 billion of
that loss to fuel theft (Cunningham, 2019). Reducing fuel theft will be vital as Pemex seeks to
return to profitability. This study uses Pemex 20-F11 forms submitted to the United States
Securities and Exchange Committee to determine the impact that crackdowns have had on
Pemex’s bottom line. While reports indicate that the measures aided Pemex and were likely a
net-positive play internal to the company, this study argues that external costs and a failure to
invest in appropriate facilities make current measures unsustainable and costly for the Mexican
federal government.
The crackdown’s enforcement measures spanned multiple branches and government
entities (Felbab-Brown, 2019; Speck, 2019). Pemex’s primary role was to temporarily change
11

SEC 20-F forms are submitted by any companies with securities trading in the United States. The 20-F is a
detailed accounting of market risk, corporate and organizational structure, planning, operational details, and
financial statements.
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how gasoline was transported, moving away from insecure pipelines and instead using ground
transport such as tanker trucks and railways which could be guarded by the Mexican military
(Cunningham, 2019; Felbab-Brown, 2019; Jones & Sullivan, 2019). Over the course of 2019,
there was a total 17.8% reduction in the amount of petroleum products transported via pipeline
(SEC, 2020).
Pemex subsidiary Pemex Logistics handles the bulk of transportation for the company
(SEC, 2020). While Pemex did not report the exact costs of changing transportation methods, the
company does disclaim that an uncharacteristically large jump in sales for its logistics
company—from 68.381 billion pesos to 93.269 billion pesos—resulted from an increase of
services provided to the company division which handles sales of gasoline (SEC, 2020). Using
the difference between 2018 and 2019 logistics sales, 24.89 billion pesos can be used as a standin for internal cost increases due to changes in the method of gasoline transport.
Pemex furthermore disclosed its total reduction in fuel theft from 2018 to 2019, which it
estimated to have saved 35.24 billion pesos (SEC, 2020). The difference between logistic sales
increases and fuel theft reduction would thus be 10.36 billion pesos, or $538,720,000 USD via
the average 2019 exchange rate of 1USD:0.052MXN (Mexican Peso to US Dollar Spot
Exchange Rate, 2019; SEC, 2020). That amount, while significant, does not lend itself to the
portrayal of the crackdown as a net-positive play for the Mexican government’s balance sheet.
The deployment of Mexico’s billion-dollar national guard to deter theft was surely a costly
exercise (Kilroy, 2021). Pemex received further aid from a variety of intelligence agencies and
other branches of the Mexican military, for which costs are not accounted for by Pemex and
cannot be easily discerned (Felbab-Brown, 2019; SEC, 2020; Speck, 2019). Lastly, the
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consequences of gasoline shortages incurred serious economic costs absorbed by the Mexican
public.
It should be noted that shortages and other costs could be mitigated. A study of the
shortages resulting from the crackdown found that shortages could be averted even with pipeline
closures if Pemex increased its finished-product storage capacity via the construction of
additional fuel terminals (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019). The study found that the
cause of shortages was an inability to get fuel to terminals frequently enough using ground
transport methods, resulting in their depletion before the next resupply; additional storage would
correct the issue (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019). Such a measure, while not
reducing the cost of ground transport, would allow Pemex to shut pipelines off suddenly without
causing shortages of gasoline (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019). That flexibility
would likely make Pemex much more capable of combatting theft.
However, there is no evidence that Pemex has taken action to make closures more
feasible. Pemex listed no new storage terminal projects for Conclusion 1/32020 or 2021, and its
capital expenditure disclosures noted only maintenance of existing storage facilities (SEC, 2020,
2021). Pemex should thus expect similar gasoline shortages if similar closures were to be
implemented again in the future.
Combining the costs of over-ground gasoline transportation, a large military and
intelligence mobilization, and the economic costs incurred by gasoline shortages, it does not
appear that the Mexican government made a positive short-term financial play in the crackdown
on huachicoleo. However, short-term finances are only one piece of the plan. An overarching
goal of the crackdown was to reduce gasoline theft long-term. Unfortunately, the reduction in
gasoline demand resulting from Covid-19 in 2020 would make any conclusions about 2020 theft
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incidents tenuous at best. The effectiveness of the crackdown in reducing theft is better measured
through an assessment of its effects on organized criminal organizations, which is addressed in
the next chapter.

AMLO’s Framing of the Economic Repercussions
In a speech discussing the results of the crackdown on April 23, 2019, AMLO makes no
mention of the economic cost of the crackdown (López Obrador, 2019). The president
furthermore claims that the government was on pace to save over 50 billion pesos from theft
reduction efforts through 2019: “We have saved so far, at the Pemex price, not at the gas station
price, we have saved 12 billion pesos. If we continue as we are, especially with the decrease that
has been recorded in the last two months, we will be able to save around 50 billion pesos by
avoiding fuel theft”12 (López Obrador, 2019). This is an especially optimistic guess given that
pipeline shutdowns had concluded (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019). This study
instead suggests a savings of 10.36 billion pesos, discounting costs accrued outside of Pemex.

Conclusions and Discussion
The crackdown on huachicoleo does not appear to have caused any significant
disruptions in the Mexican national economy. However, multiple industries reported serious
disruptions in states where gasoline shortages were most severe. While those disruptions could
be avoided with necessary investment by Pemex and the Mexican federal government, no steps
have been taken in that direction. Pemex remains unprepared for the consequences of another
pipeline shutdown.
“Llevamos ahorrados hasta ahora, a precio de Pemex, no al precio de las gasolineras, llevamos ahorrados 12 mil
millones de pesos. Si seguimos como vamos, sobre todo con la disminución que se está registrando en los dos
últimos meses, vamos a poder ahorrarnos alrededor de 50 mil millones de pesos por evitar el robo de combustible.”
12

36

The AMLO administration presented a drastically different situation than financial data
would indicate. Given the limiting factors that caused shortages—finished-product fuel storage
terminals—fuel shortages were likely a predictable outcome, as were the costs incurred through
ground transportation of fuels (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019). The administration
pushed such measures anyway and was rewarded with a political victory. It could be said that the
AMLO administration’s decision had more basis in ideology and a dramatic introduction to the
Fourth Transformation than it did the government’s balance sheet.
The same pattern can be observed with regard to organized crime. While the crackdown
made theft difficult for small cartels with limited pipeline access, nothing short of a national
shutdown of hydrocarbon transportation would prevent Mexico’s more dominant cartels from
accessing opportunities for theft. Large, decentralized criminal corporations remain capable of
accessing supply. Without significant investment in fuel storage terminals—which has yet to
begin—Pemex and the Mexican federal government should not expect another pipeline closure
to be successful. If the economic disruption in heavily affected areas is any representation, a total
national shutdown would have severe economic consequences.
Moreover, a national shutdown would not necessarily have permanent effects on the
illegal fuel theft industry. Cartels that survive a prolonged shutdown period could resume theft as
soon as transportation via pipelines is restarted. Shutdowns would thus need to seriously damage
a given criminal organization’s capacity to engage in illegal activity. The 2019 crackdown’s
effects on cartel capacity are investigated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: The Crackdown’s Effects on Organized Crime in Guanajuato
This chapter investigates the potential effects of the fuel theft crackdown on organized
criminal organizations in the state of Guanajuato. Given the impracticality of finding exact
information on organized criminal entities, this study employs a business administration
framework to investigate the crackdown’s potential effects on the two most significant organized
criminal entities in the state in 2019. This chapter argues that the crackdown on fuel theft, while
having a significant effect on one cartel, likely did little to deter fuel theft in Guanajuato in the
future. Furthermore, this study suggests that the AMLO administration may have prioritized
political appearances over long-term security strategy in its implementation of the fuel theft
crackdown.

Background
The state of Guanajuato was emphasized by the federal government as it sought to crack
down on fuel theft (Calderón, 2020). Guanajuato saw its highest-ever homicide rate and had the
second-highest number of fuel theft incidents in the year 2019; the state led Mexico in homicides
in 2018 and 2019 (Calderón, 2020; Jones & Sullivan, 2019). A combination of high fuel theft
rates along with extremely high violent crime rates made the state a target for the crackdown’s
administration (Caballero-Morales & Martínez-Flores, 2019; Calderón, 2020). In that year, the
state was primarily under the control of two organized criminal groups: The Cártel de Jalisco
Nueva Generación and the Cártel de Santa Rosa de Lima (hereafter CJNG and Santa Rosa)
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(Calderón, 2020; Jalisco Cartel New Generation, 2020; A. Torres, 2020). The characteristics of
those two organizations make the state an excellent case for observations regarding the effects of
the crackdown on fuel theft.
CJNG is a large, Jalisco-based cartel with operations in nearly every Mexican state
(Jalisco Cartel New Generation, 2020). The cartel was originally formed as a group combatting
the domination and extreme violence of the Zetas Cartel, and for some time went by the name
Los Matazetas or Zeta Killers (Correa-Cabrera, 2017; Jalisco Cartel New Generation, 2020).
Santa Rosa, named after the Guanajuato town Santa Rosa de Lima, is a smaller organization
which has operated primarily in Guanajuato since its formation (A. Torres, 2020).
The two groups have a violent history. The leader of Santa Rosa, José Antonio Yépez
(alias El Marro, “The Sledgehammer”), initiated a war with CJNG in 2017 over CJNG’s entrance
into the stolen gasoline market in Guanajuato (López Ponce, 2020; Milenio, 2017). The leader of
CJNG, Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes (alias “El Mencho”) later sent his nephew to negotiate a
merger between the two groups, with Yépez managing fuel theft operations; Yépez refused and
executed the nephew, sparking an intensified conflict between the two groups (Calderón, 2020;
López Ponce, 2020; R. Torres, 2019). The conflict is ongoing, though Santa Rosa has a seriously
reduced capacity (A. Torres, 2020).
CJNG is a highly diversified and international criminal organization. Drug trafficking
revenue is derived from sales of methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, cocaine, and marijuana in a
multitude of markets including the U.S., Canada, Australia, China, and Southeast Asia (2020
National Drug Threat Assessment 2021; Jalisco Cartel New Generation 2020). D.E.A.
intelligence indicates that CJNG has monopoly control over narcotics distribution in several U.S.
cities, including Seattle, Kansas City, Orange County, Gulfport, Orlando, and San Juan (DEA,
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2021). The cartel manufactures some narcotics, especially methamphetamine, while importing
others from Asia or other Latin American countries (Dittmar 2020). Non-drug revenue sources
include human trafficking, ransom kidnapping, extortion of business owners, fuel theft, and
coerced takeovers of small businesses (Dittmar, 2020). CJNG has committed mass killings of
seemingly random individuals not affiliated with organized crime, which might indicate greater
involvement in human trafficking and ransom kidnapping than is already known (Calderón,
2020; López Ponce, 2020; Milenio, 2012).
Santa Rosa is a much less diversified and smaller organization. U.S. intelligence gives no
indication that Santa Rosa has any major drug trafficking networks into the U.S. or abroad
(DEA, 2021). Revenues appear to be driven almost exclusively through the theft of hydrocarbons
(Sullivan & Bunker, 2019b; A. Torres, 2020; R. Torres, 2019).
Comparing how the crackdown may have affected each organization allows investigation
into the crackdown’s effectiveness in fighting small, huachicoleo-focused groups vs. larger,
more diversified criminal enterprises.

A Business Administration Analysis of Guanajuato’s Criminal Actors
The analysis of changes in illegal markets often lends itself to overly simplistic
explanations (Beckert & Dewey, 2017). While it is easy to assume that a crackdown on fuel theft
would have a negative impact on the two Guanajuato cartels engaged in the practice, this study
argues that the repercussions may have been different.
Mexican cartels have been analyzed as paramilitary groups, terror cells, mafias, and a
variety of other labels (Celaya Pacheco, 2009; Correa-Cabrera, 2017). However, it should be
emphasized that the ultimate priority of Santa Rosa and CJNG as organizations is the creation of
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profit (Correa-Cabrera, 2017). In assessing the effects of the crackdown, this study thus analyzes
the two groups as firms.
However, the crackdown on fuel theft did not necessarily address organized criminal
groups as businesses. This study argues that the implementation of measures intended to reduce
theft may have strengthened the larger cartels which form the root of Mexico’s public security
and crime crises.
In cracking down on one specific criminal activity, the AMLO administration essentially
targeted a single criminal market. For the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel, an organization which
appears to operate exclusively in that market, we can expect the crackdown to have had a strong
effect. As aforementioned, the Santa Rosa Cartel operated exclusively in zones where pipeline
shutdowns were in effect in January of 2019. Seeing as Santa Rosa likely had few or no other
sources or revenue, the crackdown likely resulted in a rapid interruption of almost all cashflow
for the organization (A. Torres, 2020).
A comparable business case is the sudden loss of income for firms in the tourism industry
during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In those cases, three factors were critical in
determining whether firms continued to meet costs: diversification, government assistance, and
cash stockpiles (Aburumman, 2020; Alves et al., 2020; Kalogiannidis, 2020). Assuming no
government assistance, Santa Rosa would either need to add additional revenue streams or rely
on existing cash reserves in an attempt to wait out government shutdowns.
CJNG presents a very different case. While the exact weight of fuel theft in CJNG’s
balance sheet cannot be known, the cartel is known to have a large number of established
revenue sources. In that sense, CJNG can be labeled variably as a “related-diversification”
business—by virtue of its enterprises all being illegal—or an “unrelated-diversification”
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business, due to the relative lack of connections between the markets in which it operates. In this
case, either structure would pay dividends. This study sees no evidence that the crackdown
would have a meaningful impact on unrelated illicit markets in which CJNG operates, such as
drug trafficking, human trafficking, or extortion. Instead, CJNG would likely have been capable
of using existing revenue sources to continue to meet costs as the crackdown was underway.
Again referencing the effects of COVID on tourism, Santa Rosa’s crisis could be compared to an
airline, while CJNG’s crisis could be compared to a conglomerate with a stake in an airline—
damaging, but by no means a business-destroying threat in and of itself.
Moreover, CJNG’s geographic reach ensured that the cartel would have been capable of
taking advantage of what the director of Pemex referred to as a “cockroach effect” of cartels
shifting theft operations based on where pipeline shutdowns were implemented (Jones &
Sullivan, 2019). CJNG’s national presence means that the infrastructure of illegal markets—
employees, logistics, and so forth—were readily available nearly wherever an opportunity for
hydrocarbon theft presented itself. Thus, CJNG was essentially faced with a regional setback to a
corporate division, whereas Santa Rosa faced a firm-wide income loss.
Those differences between two firms fighting for market share would be significant in a
legal market, but are drastically more so in an illegal market. In this case, Santa Rosa and CJNG
were in actual armed conflict over the illegal fuel market in Guanajuato (Dittmar, 2020).
Referring back to the options Santa Rosa was left with, to diversify or rely on cash reserves, each
alternative would likely have seriously reduced Santa Rosa’s capacity. Relying on excess cash, if
it existed, would have drained Santa Rosa’s resources as it fought a war against one of Mexico’s
strongest criminal groups. Diversifying would mean expanding into other illicit businesses,
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either by taking CJNG market share or attempting to take market share from another organized
criminal group while already in conflict with CJNG.

Violence in Guanajuato
The conflict between CJNG and Santa Rosa has resulted in a massive increase in violence
in Guanajuato. Homicides have hit record numbers over the past several years. Guanajuato has
had more homicides than any other state since 2018, immediately after Santa Rosa declared its
war against CJNG in October of 2017. In 2017 the state had the 3rd most homicides, and in 2016
the state had the 8th most. The crackdown, due to its significant effect on Santa Rosa, likely had
equally significant implications for violence in the state. Notably, homicides in Guanajuato
continued to rise sharply from 2018-2020 even as national homicides rates declined (INEGI,
2021).
Figure 5.1
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There is information to suggest that Santa Rosa attempted to diversify its sources of
revenue as the fuel crackdown wore on. The cartel attempted to begin deriving revenue from
extortion in Guanajuato in 2019 (A. Torres, 2020). Considering that CJNG was actively extorting
businesses in Guanajuato prior to 2019, Santa Rosa’s incursion may help explain the uptick in
violence.

Cartel Messaging During the Crackdown
Cartel communications to the public provide additional information regarding the impact
of the fuel theft crackdown. From December 10, when measures were initiated, through the end
of January, Mexican media reported two CJNG narcomantas,13 both directed towards other
cartels: Zetas Cartel remnants in Hidalgo, and Santa Rosa in Guanajuato (Anonymous, 2019a,
2019b). Rather than threaten Santa Rosa, CJNG’s narcomanta stated that Santa Rosa had
committed atrocities against the public and claimed that CJNG was not responsible for such
actions (Anonymous, 2019a).
Santa Rosa messaging was directed towards the state. On January 31, 2019, police
discovered a pickup truck containing a bedsheet narcomanta and a large quantity of explosives
(Sullivan & Bunker, 2019a). The narcomanta read:

Andrés Manuel López Obrador,
I demand that you remove the Navy, Secretary of National Defense forces and federal
forces from the state, otherwise I am going to start killing innocent people so that you see
that this is not a game and that in Guanajuato we do not need them. I’m leaving you a

13

Publicly displayed message left by a Mexican cartel, often in the form of a banner.
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little gift at my refinery so you can see how things are going to turn out, and even if you
let go of my people that were taken away, I don’t give a fuck. Face the consequences.
Best, Señor Marro14 [Sullivan & Bunker, 2019a]

The contrast between the public messaging of each group is stark. CJNG’s messaging
suggests that the group remained focused on its conflicts with other criminal groups during the
crackdown. Santa Rosa, however, took a drastic measure against the state: a direct threat of
terrorism directed towards the president of Mexico. Santa Rosa’s decision to threaten terrorism
suggests a preoccupation with the measures taken during the crackdown. The contrast between
each group’s messaging supports the possibility that crackdown efforts were far more effective
on Santa Rosa than CJNG.

CJNG and Santa Rosa since the Crackdown
CJNG has continued to expand its presence nationally since the fuel crackdown and is
considered the second-most powerful cartel in Mexico, behind only Sinaloa (Dittmar, 2020).
Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes continues to lead the organizations and remains the D.E.A.’s most
wanted fugitive (Dittmar, 2020).
Santa Rosa has lost its war against CJNG and is mostly defeated in Mexico (Dittmar,
2020). “El Marro” was arrested in 2020, along with his upper leadership, by state and federal
authorities in Mexico (Dittmar, 2020; José et al., 2020). Santa Rosa has mostly faded since (A.

“Andrés Manuel López Obrador, te exijo que saques a la Marina, Sedena y fuerzas federales del estado, si no te
voy a empezar a matar gente inocente para que veas que esto no es un juego y que en Guanajuato no los
necesitamos. Ahí te dejo un regalito en mi refinería para que veas cómo se van a poner las cosas y si sueltas a mi
gente que se llevaron y si haces caso no van a valer madre. Atente a las consecuencias. Atte. El señor marro”
14
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Torres, 2020). CJNG now dominates the area in which the fuel crackdown was implemented
(Dittmar, 2020).

The Future of Fuel Theft in Guanajuato
In April of 2019, AMLO declared fuel thieves in Guanajuato defeated: “…fuel theft has
been prevented…an issue that appeared very difficult, complex to resolve, could be
confronted”15 (López Obrador, 2019). As aforementioned, the Santa Rosa cartel has fragmented.
However, there is scant evidence to suggest that the crackdown would have had significant
impacts on the overall capacity of Mexican cartels to extract stolen fuels.
CJNG remains a national cartel with increasing influence. Now, with the collapse of the
Santa Rosa cartel, the group has control of illegal markets throughout the state of Guanajuato. If
the crackdown did, in fact, have a significant effect in reducing the Santa Rosa Cartel’s capacity,
the overall capacity of Mexican organized crime to steal fuel still has not been reduced. As has
been studied extensively, the market forces that create organized crime do not vanish with the
destruction of a single group (Correa-Cabrera, 2017). With the elimination of Santa Rosa, the
Mexican federal government likely didn’t destroy the market—rather, the government handed
the market to one firm acting within it: CJNG.
With such results being entirely predictable, the López Obrador administration’s strategy
comes into question. While the manner in which fuel theft was combatted appears unsustainable
and impractical from a security standpoint, the administration’s actions did likely result in
substantial damage to the Santa Rosa Cartel, and as such may appear successful to the general

“…se ha evitado el robo de combustibles y cómo un asunto que parecía muy difícil, complejo de resolver, se pudo
enfrentar” (López Obrador, 2019).
15
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public. AMLO’s decision to declare victory, rather than acknowledge an ongoing fight against
fuel theft, may indicate that political appearances took a higher priority than public security.
A separate possibility is that the AMLO administration had an agenda that was hidden
from the public’s eyes. Increased violence in Mexico has been partly attributed to the
fragmentation of, and resulting competition between, organized criminal organizations (Bunker,
2013; Correa-Cabrera, 2017). If the AMLO administration felt that violence in Guanajuato was
the result of violent conflict between CJNG and smaller groups, such as Santa Rosa,
strengthening CJNG in relation to smaller groups may have been a goal, rather than an
unforeseen consequence.
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Conclusion
AMLO began his crackdown on huachicoleo less than three weeks after taking office. As
is discussed in Chapter 3, it was a political success. Economically, however, it was an
insignificant gain at best and a disaster at worst. In its attempt to defeat huachicoleros, the
crackdown likely did nothing more than reduce competition in one of many illegal markets.
In addition, many of the crackdown’s outcomes were entirely predictable. The López Obrador
administration proceeded anyway.
As the president’s first major political initiative, the crackdown offers clues into AMLO’s
motivations as a politician. His prioritization of popularity over practical repercussions is a
worrisome forecast into the final years of his term. Will the president continue to use public
funding on expensive political theater? Over three years of AMLO’s term have now passed, and
plenty of government initiatives so far suggest that similar activity will continue. Far more
troubling is the possibility that similar policy will make its way into future administrations.
Many questions regarding the crackdown remain unanswered. Most notably, the
possibility remains that the crackdown was intended to strengthen large cartels at the expense of
small criminal organizations in a bid to reduce violence. Such a scenario would have major
implications for international security and warrants empirical investigation.
As Mexican cartels rapidly expand from regional gangs to continent-spanning criminal
corporations, so too grows the importance of Mexico’s security policy. Every success and failure
by Mexico’s politicians, police, intelligence agencies, and military will reverberate across the
globe. I hope this study contributes to this increasingly complex and important subject area.
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